part in bringing about the result; they constitute a train of purposive causal activity. And, since this purposive activity, involving, as essential factors, foresight and desire and design, works causally towards its goal or end, it is properly called a train of teleological or goal-seeking causation.

With causation of this type primitive men were familiar; they tended to postulate and to seek such causation of all important events. And it is indisputable that the conception of causation, of force, of energy, and the practice of seeking dynamic explanation, all alike derive from and are still founded in our universal experience of exerting such causal agency in our own persons •

It is true that, since the rise to popular favour of the mechanical biology, it has been a common practice to assume that *somehow, in principle,* it must be possible to exhibit every case of teleological or purposive causation as merely a specially complicated and obscure case of mechanical causation. But this is merely to exhibit an ill-founded prejudice and to beg the main question in dispute between the mechanical biologists and their opponents. As a matter of sober fact, all the many efforts of many highly ingenious minds, commanding all the resources of modern science, have utterly failed to exhibit any one such instance of teleological causation as really mechanical, or even to make this interpretation seem at all plausible to unbiased judges.

The Mechanical Causation Derivative

And we may go further and insist on a truth as yet but little appreciated by men of science; namely, the conception of mechanical causation not only is historically derived from the conception of teleological causation